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PART I
FOREWORD
On all sides today we hear of "plowing under
crops," "restricting output," "controlling production,"
and paying farmers "not to raise" something. In many
quarters these methods of benefiting some economic group
are condemned and even ridiculed. Their critics seem
amazed that such a foolhardy scheme was ever started in
the first place, forgetting that were they in the same
position, they would probably endorse the same plan or
one similar in purpose. To those who chide Brazilians
for restricting the output of coffee it should be pointed
out that the first three attempts at controlling pro-
duction were immensely successful, the second and third
resulting in profits of 70^ and 40/o respectively on the
capital invested. It was only natural that measures to
"defend" the price of coffee permanently were entered
upon with great optimism in 1922. In the same way
British producers of rubber welcomed the Stevenson Plan
in 1922 because they foresaw large profits in it for
themselves. Likev/ise, the farmers in this country be-
came tired of receiving only 50^ a bushel for their
wheat and thus acclaimed the A, A, A. with enthusiasm. And
who can blame them? The industry or agricultural group
that allows itself to be snowed under by an ever-increas-
ing surplus is certainly improvident and short-sighted.
'iobr, i vn rr/olq'* lo x Lo .i> r/x:
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From the social point of viev/ this is possibly a narrow
way of looking at it, yet one should examine each plan
thoroughly and impartially before passing final judgment
on it, because in many cases what is advantageous to one
economic group reacts in the long run to the benefit of
other groups.
In selecting coffee, rubber, and tin as com-
modities to be studied, I do not propose to set them up
as necessarily typical of regulated conimodities , The
primary reason for choosing them is that they are all
important. It is necessary to note that this thesis is
essentially an examination of the regulation of specific
products rather than a consideration of all regulation
in general. V/here the regulatory measures show elements
in common, I have attempted to direct attention to
them and where certain features point towards the pos-
sible outcome of future restriction plans, I have tried
to demonstrate their application, but only on the basis
of the three commodities concerned.
Method of approach .
In building up the background for each raw
material the procedure has been to indicate the coun-
tries or interests most concerned in Its production,
trace the history of the production of it, and show the
course of prices and market conditions. Then early con-
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trol plans have been scrutinized--follov/ed by a review
of those now or lately in operation. In conclusion a
summary has been made of the social ineffectiveness
of control schemes and the obstacles presenting them-
selves to their present and future operation.
Before concluding I wish to make grateful ack-
nov/ledgment to Professor Max Hartmann of the Boston Univer-
sity College of Business Administration for his invaluable
advice and criticism during the writing of this thesis.
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INTRODUCTION
V/orld coimnod-ity defined .
"Vv'orld commodity" is a term which is perhaps
liable to be misinterpreted. To be classed as a world
commodity an article must be one which is consumed on a
large scale in parts of the world usually distant from
the region where it is produced or is consumed in regions
in addition to that in which it is produced* The com-
modity is essentially one which enters into ocean commerce
and is transported from one continent to another.
The problem of surpluses .
It is difficult to find a raw material in which
the problem of a temporary unnecessary supply has not been
encountered at some time in the history of its production.
It is important to note, however, that staple articles of
food such as wheat and meat have faced a surplus only in
restricted areas of the world. In countries like China,
Japan, and Italy there is usually an actual scarcity.
Rather have surplus stocks been found most prevalent in
the raw material group such as tin, and rubber, and among
semi-staple crops such as coffee.
In the matter of surpluses of agricultural
products such as rubber and coffee some economists like
Timoshenko^ ascribe the causes to maladjustments in the
1. Timoshenko, Vladimir- -V/orld Agriculture and the De-
pression, Michigan Business Studies, p. 569.

production and consumption of the commodity itself,
while other authorities, such as Copeland, 2 claim that'
they were caused by "economic factors so universal in
scope and of such force that they largely outweighed
the special conditions influencing the price of each
commodity," Whatever the underlying causes, there is no
dispute over the facts of the situation itself. They are
familiar to everyone. Production had outrun consumption
so far that by 1930 world stocks^ had piled up to the
extent of 29,000 tons of tin, 28,509,000 bags of coffee,
and 365,000 tons of crude rubber.
These surpluses hanging over the market act as
a depressing influence on prices because buyers refrain
from buying if they believe additional supplies will be
thrust on to the market at some future date. The price
of tin in New York was pushed down to 18j^ per pound in
1933,^ rubber to less than 5^ per pound in 1931,^ and
coffee to 6.1jz^ per pound in 1931.^
Significance of the problem of surpluses .
Maladjustments between supply and demand have
their repercussions throughout the v/orld. An understand-
ing that the problem of surpluses is not only a national
2. Copeland, Melvin--Raw Material Prices and Business
Conditions, Harvard Univ., Grad, School of Bus, Admin. p.
3. Ibid
—
pp. 5, 11, 25, 28
4. Business Week—Nov. 11, 1933,
5. Copeland, Melvin--Raw Material Prices and Business
Conditions, pp. 4, 26, 28.
6. Ibid.
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but international one is vital if the world is ever to
make progress towards preventing the conditions that
cause world depressions. That the oversupply of wheat
was considered at the London Economic Conference in
1933 is encouraging, not so much from actual results
accomplished, but on account of the fact that the problem
is receiving more attention each year. To be sure, the
control of production exactly in accordance with demand
is an achievement beyond the power of mortal man, but to
gauge it more accurately than it has been done in the
past is certainly possible of achievement.
A word or two should be enough to illustrate
the mutual dependence that one country has on another.
V/hen the purchasing power for British and American goods
of the people of Brazil is seriously cut by a drastic
decline in the price of coffee, the ability of the British
and Americans to sell their manufactured goods in South
America is lessened and industries producing those goods
are correspondingly depressed. Likewise, a surplus of
rubber in the Middle East results in a decrease of the
power of that region to purchase from other countries
manufactured articles to be used in developing their raw
material resources.
Adverse affects on world trade are not the most
important reasons for studying the problem of surpluses.
V/hen we focus our attention on the producing country
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alone, it is plain that capital invested in unnecessary
coffee or rubber plantations, or tin mines represents a
social waste. By “ unnecessary
“
productive capacity I
mean capacity for which no long-time permanent demand
exists. Most any plantation may produce temporarily in
excess of current consumption,—then, wnen stocks Degin
moving again this production is absorbed.
Likewise, labor expended in producing commodities
for which no profitable market exists is a social loss be-
cause it rightfully should be employed in more socially
profitable enterprise. The portion of total cost repre-
sented by labor in the burning of |70,000 worth of coffee
daily in Brazil towards the end of the summer of 1931, if
diverted into the cultivation of bea.ns and corn, would at
least have raised the standard of living of Brazilian
laborers slightly even though such crops do not enter
into international trade.
Review work done by others in this field .
t
Perhaps the most exhaustive study in the regu-
lation of world commodities is that conducted by Benjamin
B. V/allace and Lynn R. Edrainster under the supervision
of the Brookings Institution of Washington, D. G. In
their book ''International Control of Raw Materials,"
written in 1930, tney review control measures in sodium
nitrate, camphor, potash, coffee, rubber, and pulpwood.
ni f.en: c^imIc ai zl ,9vcIa
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They consider at length how consumer relief from undue
elevation of prices may be obtained and survey the
attitude that is developed in consuming countries towards
governments which permit price-raising by restrictive
measures
.
Other works of value are "Foreign Combines to
Control the Prices of Rav/ Materials," by Herbert Hoover,
v/ritten as Secretary of Commerce in 1926 and published
as a Trade Bulletin by the United States Department of
Commerce; "Artificial Control Schemes and the World’s
Staples" by J,W.P. Rov;e, published in Index, April, 1935;
Government Control of Crude Rubber, a book by Charles R.
V/hittlesey, written in 1931; and "Raw Material Prices
and Business Conditions," a study by Melvin T. Copeland,
made in May 1933, and published by the Graduate School of
Business Administration, of Harvard University.
Purpose of this stud:/ .
Before being condemned or praised, the restrictive
plan for each commodity must plainly be considered on its
merits. Yet after all facts are considered, the adverse
effects of control schemes on consumers and on our
economic society seem to outv/eigh their beneficial in-
fluences. The purpose of this study is to bring to-
gether such obstacles as must inevitably present them-
selves to the smooth operation of restrictive agreements
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and v/ith these in mind point out that the chances of fail-
ure hulk larger than the prospects of su.ccess.
Brief survey of methods used in the past to re>~^ulate prices
and output of a product.
Adam Smith in his Vv'ealth of Nations written in
1776 said, "People of the same trade hardly meet together
even for merriment or diversion but the conversation ends
in a conspiracy against the public or in some contrivance
to raise prices." What was true 160 years ago is true to-
day and probably will be true for a long time in the future
Early attempts at controlling output on a much
smaller scale than those we are concerned v/ith doubtless
can be found in the economic history of every nation. The
object has invariably been the same, --to maintain or raise
prices by achieving artificial scarcity. The measures em-
ployed in the United States are cited here, not because
they are any more important than similar devices in foreign
countries but because they are closer at hand.
The most subtle methods were simple unv/ritten
agreements regarding prices. Well-lmovm in this respect
are the" Gary dinners" of steel manufacturers, at which the
members of the industry met to talk over trade conditions.
"Here there was no understanding reached to maintain prices
but the general effect v/as that prices v/ere maintained.""^
Another example is the Cordage Manufacturer's Association
7. Curtis, hoy Emerson--Trust s and Economic Control
M' c Graw - Hill, 1931--New York--p.25
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T^hich had no constitution or by-lav/s, nop any officers
except a secretary. Here a member simply stated that
he was planning to raise prices and the others could fol-
low or not. No one had to agree to anything.
More definite were the pooling agreements which
follov/ed and became common in the 1870* s. Here there were
three main types: (1) output or traffic pools, (2) ter-
ritory or market pools, and (3) income pools. They func-
tioned as their titles imply. There were usually written
articles stating the obligations of the various members.
The most common type of pool was the "output” pool in
which the participants agreed to restrict production to
a certain percentage of capacity. Pools did not become
a permanent form of control because not only did members
themselves often exceed their production quotas but the
agreements were held in individual states as violations
of the common law prohibiting restraint of trade.
After the collapse of pooling agreements, we
find the beginning of trusts and the increasing size of
corporations. Since these are specific business forms
rather than purely control devices, they are not within
our province to consider.
An Important development in control plans in-
volving pooling agreements on an international scale.
came with the organization of Copper Exporters Inc. in
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1926 under the Wehh-Pomerene Law of the United States.
This organization is very similar to the international
cartels of Europe. Its members include the major copper
producers of North and South Araerica, the British Metals
Corporation, and Belgian and German companies. The com-
panies in this group control 90^ of the v/orld output of
copper. "An international committee representing the
Copper Exporters and its associates regularly sets a
t
price c.i.f. Hamburg. Such a policy requires pooling
and limitation of exports which are in turn dependent upon
O
production 'testriction agreements.
Adoption of control principle by governments .
The most ambitious control plans, hov/ever, are
those instituted or sanctioned by the governments of cer-
tain countries having a partial or complete monopoly of
commodities essential to the rest of the world. Familiar
among these are those involving the production of rubber,
coffee, and tin.
It is difficult to trace the steps that mark
the increase of government intervention in control mea-
sures. The progress of governments regulating potash
nitrate, and coffee has been steadily upward, whereas in
the case of sisal, silk, rubber, and Egyptian cotton.
8. Quarterly Journal of Economics - Nov. 1931 - The
Copper Industry and the Tariff, Robert Pettengill,
p. 145.
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government control was
plan.^ In general the
creasing complexity of
them beyond the bounds
instituted at the onset of the
tendency has been tov/ards in-
control plans and expansion of
of a single government.
9. V/allace and Edralnster-International Control of Raw
Materials, Brookings Institution 1930, p. 11.
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PART II
Coffee—An early example of reg'olation
of a world commodity
History of the coffee industry .
“Up to the close of the seventeenth century
the world's entire, although limited, supply of coffee
was obtained from the province of Yemen in south Arabia,
where the true celebrated Mocha or Mokka coffee is still
produced. At this time, however, plants were successfully
introduced from Arabia to Java, where the cultivation was
immediately taken up. The government of Java distributed
plants to various places, including the botanic garden
of Amsterdain. Tne Portugese introduced coffee into
Ceylon. From Amsterdam the Dutch sent the plant to
SuPinam in 1718, and in the same year Jamaica received
it tnrough the governor Sir Nicholas Lawes. V/ithin a
few years coffee reached the other West Indian islands,
and spreeLd generally through the tropics of the New World,
which now produce by far the greater portion of the
1
world's supply."
Before the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury Brazil did not push to greatest advantage her favor-
able conditions of soil and climate. But soon coffee-
1. Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Eleventh Edition, vol. VI,
p. 647.
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growing reached such a tremendous scale that there was
little room to raise other crops and many had to be
imported,^ - The coffee growing area of Brazil is cen-
tered in the state of Sao Paulo and covers about
1, 158,000 square miles. Coffee is a crop which is
harvested in largest quantities in August, September
and October. The crop year begins July 1st and ends
June 30th of the next year.
Consumers who prefer strong blends are a
distinct advantage to Brazil. Most of her coffee is
strong while that grov/n in other coujitries is mild.
Since U.S. drinkers prefer strong blends, this country
still obtains almost tv/o-thirds of its supplies from
Brazil. Consumers do not quickly shift from one brand
to another, hence Brazil's position still seems secure
in this respect as far as the United States goes. How-
ever, as regards that portion of this country's con-
sumption which is represented by nev«r coffee drinkers,
each year has seen an increase in the buying of mild
brands, especially those of Colombia, rather than the
purchasing of Brazilian grades.
2.. Wallace and Deminster, International Control of
Raw Materials, p. 123.
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Ownership of capital invested in coffee plantations.
Most of the capital invested in coffee planta-
tions is contributed by Brazilians. The follov/ing table,
taken from the census of 1925 of the State of Sao Paulo,
shows the large percentage of native producers. Since
over -g- of the total Brazilian coffee crop is produced in
Sao Paulo, it is safe to consider these figures as
representative of the entire industry.
Nationality of Sao Paulo Coffee Producers
Nationality Number of
Properties
Number
of trees
planted
'rationality Number of Number
properties of trees
planted
Brazilian 25,566 716,118,865 British 16,620,000
Italian 11,632 166,171,22£ Austrian 164 2,967,343
Portuguese 1,521 33,629,891 Various 438 15,451,663
German 617 20,771,404
Spanish 1,151 17,804,063 Total 989,534,455
Source: U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Trade Promotion Series
No. 92, 1930, "The Coffee Industry in Brazil",
p. 30.
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Pecullarities of coffee-a;rowinK
.
Predominance of coffee cultivation in an area
results in overdependence on it, Brazil is characteris-
tically a one-crop region, although other crops such as
corn, rice, beans, and fruit were once grown there. The
profitableness of coffee-growing has been both a source
of strength and weakness. A normal or scarce crop,
assuming no carry-over from the previous year, results
in profitable world prices and correspondingly good
returns to grov/ers. An excessively large crop depresses
world prices to disastrous levels or causes the piling
up of stocks which hinder price rises in subsequent
years. If v/ider diversification of crops existed, the
losses on coffee might be absorbed by favorable prices
for the other crops.
The only way Brazil can pay her foreign creditors
is in goods or in gold. In late years she has had to pay
heavy service charges on her foreign debt, A premium on
foreign currencies results when coffee reaches an unduly
lov/ price because the monetary value of exports is so
seriously cut. Then gold must leave the country and
internal financial collapse with its political reper-
cussions follows. Hence, the dependence of Brazil on
the price of coffee is much more than an economic problem.
The coffee tree is an example of a perennial
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which doesn’t begin to pay for itself from the berries
produced until it is four to seven years old. This
point is significant in considering the apparent in-
ability of the coffee supply to adjust itself to demand.
The trees are planted during a period when prices are
attractive. After 4-7 years they come into bearing, per-
haps when prices have slumped. Since the output of a
coffee tree cannot be controlled like the output of a
factory or even like the production of latex by rubber
trees, the coffee crop must be harvested when the
berries are ripe. If there were an excessive number of
trees planted six years back, the market is flooded with
coffee unsaleable at a profit-allov/ing price. Elizabeth
Gilboy of the Harvard Committee on Social Research has
studiea the history of coffee and has shown that vie can
expect a production cycle of 8 to 14 years in length. ^ *
The basis of it is this 4-7 year period which the coffee
tree requires to come to maturity.
History of prices and production .
Besides Brazil coffee production is carried
on extensively in Colombia, Java, and Central America.
The production of Brazil, however, is by a wide margin
the largest of the four countries. Other regions of
lesser Importance are British India, Haiti, Mexico, and
5* Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1934, pp. 675-678
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Venezuela. "During the period 1909-1912, Brazil furnished
about 72^ of the world's supply of coffee. After that the
percentage fell somewhat until in 1925 it was 68>i>. This
loss was a proportionate and not a numerical one as
Brazil's total exports had increased by over 200,000,000
pounds in 1925. Her loss in relative importance was due
largely to the increase in the trade of Colombia, whose
exports of coffee have almost trebled during the period.
During 1922-25, Brazil furnished about 70)-o of the world's
4
coffee." After 1925 Brazil's statistical position
in the world coffee trade declined as is evidenced by
the fact that from 1925 through 1929 she furnished
5-
approximately 6d.5}o of the worlds s supply of coffee.
In tracing the history of prices and production.
Miss Gilboy has outlined a 8-14 year production cycle
6
and has shown how regulation arose out of it. "In 1874
a year of high prices, large investments were made in
coffee plantations in Sao Paxilo. By 1879 a new crop had
begun to flood the market and prices began a steady
downswing, terminating in the low prices of 1882-86. From
1879 to 1887 overproduction existed with resulting accumu-
lation of stocks of coffee and drop in prices. The early
4. Pratt, “'dward E.
,
International Trade in Staple
Commodities, p. 250.
5. Wallace, and Edminster, International Control of
Raw Materials, p. 166, table taken from Le Cafe.
6. Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1924,
pp. 675—678.
.-I91/-J flctVi :r'JL;x i-c^I jboiteq en? ^wIITuC^
bc;f ‘ijiJ’l; .srr. ico lo a’oX’iovr sr!J lo t,5V Suc^/i
a;.T*
, o: / Ji feJFej ill ii^i;i: iJijnwiiikion XXt** 9:;.^>Tr^oxoc
^ao Ir.ot'z^.'wa, b ^ 0:1 5r>; ^i^sroit-xc-.o-iq r* a/^rr atol
000, "'0, V Cti; '£9 VO ^;i osii a^ioqJCta •
.lisjjifi
9i^/) 3.J - ociu'5-£oc-.i evXiJill?) ; £:i aacJ toM .oKt;X £rX CD.ii/oq
saof/i» ,i5idi:;oXoG -c tijjixX tii OR^.>ioni ont oi- ’/Ib^ubJ
.':ci :rq 1?* .
.‘•aofaXjB avjcil c^dl'ico ’io e^xcotf.
-od? 10 c;07 3£,'C5^
-OiiaX'.’Xi^i Xi::r:^X ,CS*~-ocr gj:iTU0
A
A*
ncX^ isoq . 'i-s- xa .f^€X ^
.'-^l\oo
XO LK‘OfiS£>xve Ri ags i>oijXXos:: dxujxX sottoo x;Xioff eili ni
Jb«r;3in^u^ :<iia £5i-:X ri-£;-cTiiX ^aZI miQx'r
•c
. 3 IS 0U iO \;1< ojJe s^i/Xiotr 9r.i Ic . >c/ ^Xt. J£r*ri:icicc^3
, roXc^D; .>cxq yrts v. oil':; ^icirsic: jclc .iiioffid ril
!9Xo'<o iicic*'0;;i^oTa r. arf,- \;ooXiO oai^i:
<
*1 -*
£*V8X al^* 10 Ji/o dac ij- i ?7 or. iTA'cao jBJJr. i>tu;
r.i liiiXjxa oi& v p« i^'9.u;J5j»'vni 9^i.;I
,
aaoiin' /0;Xi: “^o i^i&Y js
ij.'S.i cold -.v^ii B e^cX .o Xci?^ ofiX nl qcic . ' - hbL 9s‘iloj
XOMOf^ fi ..-’Ollq LiliS i'rilllisai dj i;CcX- 0 ; njL'.tC
..0-4.*
...•6-?IB8X 'Jo Bt»oiT<7 »or dni ni 1 ;
,
ni'Aijr.woi)
-oinuooB a-‘'^i^Xt'«fei iXt^icT v'Dieixs noi>ouoc/iw'
5t^//v YdoX oc- 6V0 X
\,Xi'^y 0 .. i .art.^i i(^ i.i QC'ij dc-ti uft*'Xoc AW r*^ot - o noliilX
oTciciS r:X :ix9i'. f|\* X. :
'io I 1.+,..-
.''‘JijO ej
• .*
•
^
-i ;X
•- X iX’» Kn-.Jii
;
.vt'lC •. ifu >£
woll: r ;
-, ^, r'i
,
Eo:., Ci-.c-v
, X^JAHroL
ifflx»o»i.;oO
,^ 0-aXXf .0
-19-
90’s were again a period of high prices. Surplus stocks
were disposed of and new planting began again, with the
inevitable result of overproduction and fall in prices
from 1897-1900, Owing to a simultaneous fall in the ex-
change rate, which is dominated by the coffee industry,
Brazilian planters did not feel the effects of over-
production until 1900 and had continued vdth nev/ plantings,
"The bumper crop of 1901-1902 prolonged the
coffee crisis and led to the first attempts at artificial
control of the industry. Planting v/as for a time for-
bidden but during the price rise of 1911-19, new planting
started up again. After 1918, the situation grew so bad
that in 1924, artificial control was entered upon as a
permanent policy.
"Each attempt at artificial control, beginning
in 1883-84 with attempt of Brazilian government to finance
market operations and ending with federal control in 1931
has met ^ftlth the same problem. Stocks must be stored for
some years before the market can absorb them,
"Except for first valorization scheme of 1906,
when Sao Paulo government held over 10 million bags of
coffee and disposed of them within five years, artificial
control was short-lived before 1918. After 1918 artificial
control became permanent policy,"
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From 1922 to 1927 the coffee industry did not
encounter any serious problems because during most of
these years crops were normal. The world crop averaged
about 21,000,000 bags during the four years preceding the
crop year 1927-28. In that year production jumped
tremendously notably in Brazil. The world crop was
33,948,000 bags® and unsold stocks at the end of the
year remained large. The exceptionally small crop
which followed in 1928-29 redu.ced the carry-over con-
siderably. But world production in 1929-30 was larger
than ever and amounted to 37,677,000 bags. A tremendous
surplus of 28,509,000 bags in June 1930 was the result.
In 1922 the monthly average price of Rio No.
7
Brazil grades, at Nev/ York was 10.3j2^. In 1925 it had
shown a progressive upward climb to 20.3. Then came a
marked decline in price when the abundant crop of
1927-28 came on the market but it was soon followed by
a price pick-up when the small crop of 1928-29 appeared.
A drastic drop in price occurred in 1930 because of the
depressing effect of the tremendous crop of 1929-30
and the surplus stocks. The price kept falling until
it reached a low of 4.88^^ per pound in April, 1931.
The price rose again after April so that the average for
1932 was 8.1^, The valorization plan carried on by the
8. Copeland, Melvin--Kaw Material Prices and Business
Conditions, p. 28, table 28.
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Brazilian government contributed in large part to this
price rise.^ Prices of Rio No, 7 at New York hovered
around |.08 per pound for the first half of 1933, then
dropped slightly to $.076 towards the end of the year.
Prices rose to a high of 11^ in March, 1934, then de-
clined to 9^jzf at the end of the year. A slump followed
in 1935, reaching a lov^ point in August at The
price of Santos No. 4 grade followed the same general
trend. Crops were so abundant in 1934-35 that
coffee growers in Brazil continued their restriction
schemes. These measures did not prevent the slump in
prices in 1935 but probably prevented it from reaching
disastrously lov/ levels. The destruction of coffee,
which was discontinued for a time, has been resumed on
a large scale,
"Following a year of sub-noiraal imports of
coffee into United States, in 1934 it was to be expected
that 1935 trade would show a distinct swing in the
opposite direction. Returns for the first nine months
bear out this expectation. From them, 1935 promises to
register the second largest importation of coffee in
the country’s history,"^^
9.
Copeland, Raw Material Prices and Bus. Conditions.
p. 28.
10, Survey of Current Business, December 1933, 1934, 1935.
11, Tea and Coffee Trade Journal, November, 1935, p. 416.
12, Ibid., December, 1935, p. 47j..
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Early attempts at restricting output .
In 1900-01 the coffee crop in Brazil was the
largest on record but in 1901-02 it was even larger. A
severe drop in prices naturally occurred. The New York
price of Rio No. 7 fell from 8.26 to 6.48 in 1901, to
6.03 in 1902, and to 5.43 in 1903. Prom this developed
the first measures for government control. A prohibitive
tax was placed on land devoted to new planting in the
State of Sao Paulo. This tax plan, however, was not
strictly carried out. There really was no need for it,
anyway, because the low prices acted as a deterrent to
new plant ing.^^
It was still too soon for prices to be affected
by the decrease in new planting. A serious depression
developed during which ownership of many plantations
passed into the hands of banks and foreigners because
foreclosure was necessary. Popular resentment against
such a state of affairs almost precipitated a revolution.
To aggravate the seriousness of the situation, another
huge crop loomed in 1905. Accordingly, Sao Paulo in the
latter part of 1905 officially entered upon a policy of
valorization. (Valorization may be summarized as the pur-
chase by the government of coffee on a scale large enough to
enable it to control the price.) At the end of the year
13. V/allace and Edminster, International Control of
Raw Materials, p. 126.
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the state placed a surtax of 3 francs on every bag of
coffee exported so as to obtain money to purchase coffee
to withhold from market. Also the movement of coffee
from the interior into Santos was restricted to 50,000
bags for each trading day.^^
The Sao Paulan government at first did not
have sufficient revenue to buy in large enough quantities
to prevent the accumulation of surpluses. It started
buying in August 1906 v^rith the purchase of 2,000,000
bags and continued buying through December 1907, at
which time it held 8,146,000 bags.
In August 1908 additional control measures
were instituted. The suj?tax on coffee exported was in-
creased from 3 francs per bag to 5 francs. Furthermore,
a law was passed which placed an additional tax of 20^
on exports over 9,000,000 bags during the crop year
1908-09, over 9,500,000 bags in 1909-10, and over
10,000,000 bags in 1910-11.
In 1908 British, French, German, and American
bankers supplied a loan of 1.15,000,000 to enable Sao
Paulo to
,
pay back an earlier loan and finance the storing
of the surplus coffee. The coffee purchased in 1906-07
14. V/allace and Edminster, International Control of
Raw Materials, p, 128.
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was taken as security for the loan and the selling of
it was in the hands of a committee which included one
representative of Sao Paulo and 6 representatives of
the bankers. The loan was repaid in 1914, This per-
mitted the Sao Paulan government to take over the re-
maining unsold coffee. In 1918 the last of this was
sold.
Messrs. Wallace and Edminster offer a favor-
able opinion of this first attempt at valorization.^^
The first valorization and the restrictive measures which
accompanied it prevented a severe fall in price in 1906-
07, and enabled the Committee conducting the operations
to maintain an artificial price during the years 1910,
1911, and 1912 higher than that v/hich the statistical
position of coffee seemed to justify. This hi^er price
resulted in a benefit to the merchants and bankers, to
the government of Sao Paulo, and to the coffee planters,
and in a corresponding burden on consumers. The popular
indignation felt because of this bureau resulted in some
international friction. In passing judgment, however,
it should be remembered that this burden must be weighed
against the possibly greater burden to which consumers
15. Wallace and Edminster, International Control of
Raw Materials, p. 144.
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might have been subjected had no action been taken."
The second and third valorization measures, 1917-1925 .
Due to the V/orld V/ar exports to Central Europe
were stopped and restrictions were placed upon imports
into belligerent countries. The effect on movement of
stocks was so great that stocks in Santos increased
from 889,000 bags in July 1916 to 5,639,000 in July
1917. In 1917-18 the crop was 3,000,000 more than the
year before. These influences precipitated a drop in
price towards the end of 1917 to a pound. The
State of Sao Paulo borrowed enough money from the
federal government to buy up the surplus of 3,074,000
bags. This purchase was opportune in saving prices
from a further decline. In 1919 there was a rise in
prices for the follov/ing reasons; (l) in the next 2
years there followed the smallest crops since 1900;
(2) at the same time trade v;ith Germany picked up
again and from it sprang increased demand for coffee.
The coffee previously purchased was sold at a profit
of |i20,000,000. Yet, it is hardly possible that
valoriz-ation itself did any more than make prices a
little firmer.^®
16. Wallace and Edminster, International Control of
Raw Materials, pp. 145-146.
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The third valorization merely strengthened
prices rather than raised them to any extent. Con-
ditions leading up to it were the small crop in 1919-20
which was followed by a large crop in 1920-21, Not
only was v/orld demand slack on account of the wide-
spread depressed condition of business but countries
in Europe had placed taxes on the importation of
luxuries, including coffee, thus diminishing imports.
The consequence of this situation was that the New
York price of Rio No, 7 began to fall. At the end
of 1917 it reached 7jz^ a pound and continued downward
to 5^ in March 1921, This time the federal government
played the most important part in the plan instead of
the State of Sao Paulo, It started to purchase coffee
in March 1921 and once had 4,534,000 bags on hand.
Shipments of coffee into Santos were limited to
30,000 bags daily and were later cut to 28,000 bags
in Santos and 11,000 bags in Rio,
Since the Santos crop of 1922-23 was a very
short one, prices started an upswing in the middle of
1921, vAiich continued until January 1925, Thus nature
came to the aid of coffee growers and was a big factor
in the success of the third plan. It is difficult to
say how much of the price rise was caused by valorization
measures, but they can hardly be credited with any more
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than a small share in view of the fact that when the
stored coffee was sold by the federal government in
1923, the upward trend in prices continued rather than
ceased. The Brazilian governments profits in the sale
were estimated at 40/o of the capital invested,
The Institute for the Permanent Defense of Coffee^^
So successful was the third valorization
plan that there was little opposition when a measure
for permanent control of the coffee supply was proposed.
The federal government of Brazil passed legislation in
June, 1922, creating the Institute for the Permanent
Defense of Coffee, It was part of a general lav/ designed
to develop trade in a selected group of Brazilian products.
Ill feeling soon arose in Sao Paulo because the federal
government occupied itself v/ith other commodities besides
coffee. Also it endeavored to raise Brazilian exchange
rates. This v/as harmful to the interests of producers
and exporters. Accordingly, the federal government gave
up the plan in 1924 and the State of Sao Paulo entered
the field again. Towards the end of 1924 it purchased
from the federal government ten large warehouses which
had been constructed in the interior. The next step
v/as to pass a law for the Permanent Defense of Coffee.
17, Wallace and Edminster, International Control of
Raw Materials, pp. 146-150.
IB. Ibid., pp. 150-170.
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The administration was to be carried on by an Institute
or committee consisting of the Ministers of Finance and
Agriculture, one representative of the exporters, and
two representatives of the coffee planters. The directing
head was the Minister of Finance.
The control of prices by the Institute was to
be accomplished through two devices: the publication of
statistics and the regulation of quantities, coming into
the market at Santos. The publication of statistics
was designed to curb speculation and unusual price
changes by giving publicity to the exact condition of the
market
.
The outstanding feature of the new plan was
the establishment of government warehouses in the in-
terior. This made it easy to limit entries into Santos
because immense quantities of coffee could be stored
in them. The warehouses have been added to continually
since 1924, and now probably have a capacity of over
12,000,000 bags. The lav; compels planters to send all
their coffee to government warehouses. Thus, stocks
are always in sight and it is to the government to
handle them most advantageously. Railroads obtain
shipments only from the warehouses. The first lot of
coffee put in the storehouse is the first one to be
taken out
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In 1926 the Coffee Institute borrov/ed
tl0,000,000 from London bankers to cover the expenses
of storing the coffee which could not be covered b3>^
taxes alone. Additional borrowings from the same
source were resorted to in 1927, 1928, and 1929. All
of these funds v/ere used to make loans to coffee
growers. The collateral for them v/as bills of lading
and warehouse receipts.
A tax of one milreis gold (54^) on every
bag of coffee transported from warehouses to Santos
was levied to take care of the general expenses of
permanent defense, interest on, and amortization of
foreign loans.
The tremendous crop of 1927-28 was handled
by the extension of financial support to grov/ers up to
75^ of the market value of their coffee, for which the
grov/ers paid S - 9% interest. There was no price col-
lapse on account of the large crops at this time. There
v/as, hov/ever, a serious increase in stocks.
These defense measures seem to have been res-
ponsible for keeping prices up for several years. In
January 1925 the price of 23.5^ was the highest in the
history of coffee. Then came a decline to 13.33j^ in
September 1927. After that the trend was upward again
until February 1929.
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All this time large stocks of coffee were
piling up in warehouses. When permanent defense was
adopted, a nev; situation arose. Regulation of sup-
plies accessible to exporters came wholly under the
hand of defense authorities. In July 1924 almost
4,600,000 bags were held in the interior. Supplies
in Brazilian ports remained small. Thus, the amounts
kept off the market must have held prices at a higher
level than they would have been ordinarily.
WTien the actual harvesting of the 1927-28
crop began, prices began to rise on account of the
continued limitation of shipments to port. Almost
13,000,000 bags had piled up in the warehouses by the
end of the crop year 1927-28. This was as much as the
exports for an entire year.
After the small crop in 1929 it was possible
to reduce the supply in storage by 4,000,000 bags.
This was not enough, however, to prevent the crisis
which arose in 1929-30 because of the large new crop.
At this time world production began to outrun world
consumption by a wide margin. "in July 1929 the
visible world supply of coffee was 14,250,000 bags
of which approximately 10,500,000 bags (including stocks
in the interior) v/ere in Brazil, and it was estimated
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that on July 1, 1930, the visible supply would be be-
tween 21 and 22 million bags, of which some 8 or 9
million bags would be held in Brazil. Such a sur-
plus would be only about 2,000,000 bags short of annual
world consumption. These stocks had been carried by credit.
Finally, the credit of the Institute and private banks be-
came exhausted. Assets everywhere were frozen. A severe
drop in prices from 16|^ a pound in September to Ilf in
November was the result. The institute had to borrow
from outside sources again -- this time from British,
Continental, and American bankers. The loan was for
$100,000,000 and was secured by 16,500,000 bags of
coffee.. The loan agreement provided that this entire
amount must be sold within ten years and that future
crops must be marketed currently. The agreement in
regard to future current marketing of crops was con-
sidered on all sides as an indication of the collapse
of the defense plan.
Repercussions from the plan for permanent defense .
The high prices of coffee caused a decrease
of purchases in the United States. Imports into this
country in 1925 decreased 9% from the previous year.
There was also a reaction to the Institutes operations
19. Ibid., p. 160
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in its ovm country. It was claimed that shipments into
Santos had not been regulated as well as they had been
in earlier years. The charge v/as made that a larger
part of the crop was allowed to come to market in the
early part of the crop year 1925-26 than in some pre-
vious years, and that the valorization purchases did
not keep prices steady. In some circles the Institute
was criticized for raising prices too high and in
other circles for keeping them too lov/.
One of the primary aims had been to stimulate
the raising of other crops besides coffee. This purpose
seems to have been defeated rather than promoted because
the raising of coffee prices made coffee planting more
profitable than ever before over the sale of other crops.
The acreage devoted to coffee planting increased not
only in the state of Sao Paulo but also in other parts of
Brazil.
The collapse of prices in 1929-30 demonstrates
the difficulties to be overcome in executing a plan for
keeping supplies off the market, v/hether through purchases
by the state (valorization) or through providing store-
house and credit facilities to grov;ers (permanent
defense )
.
The cause of the failure of permanent defense
seems to lie in its undue elevation of prices. In 1924
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the great rise in prices undoubtedly stimulated new
planting of coffee trees. The crop from these trees
augmented the already large supply and caused the pre-
cipitous drop in prices which began early in 1929.
Continuation of the problem .
The Brazilian revolution of October 1930
was largely caused by the harsh feeling aroused to-
wards the Sao Paulo defense plan. A provisional
government came into power of the revolution. In
February 1931 a decree 7/as passed which allowed more
liberal shipments of coffee to Santos. At the same
time a tax of 1 railreis was placed on every new tree
planted during the next five years. These measures
seem to have had no effect. Surplus stocks were
20,030,000 in July 1931, and a new crop of 15,000,000
bags had to be added to it. World consumption was
predicted at 24,600,000.
Various other devices were tried to efforts
to wipe out the surplus. One of them was a system of
exchanges. 1,050,000 bags of coffee were exchanged
for 25,000,000 bushels of wheat from the United States
Eleven airplanes from Italy were swapped for their
monetary equivalent in coffee. Proposals were also
made to trade coffee for German coal and Russian wheat
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k more drastic method of eliminating the surplus v/as the
actual burning of coffee. It began at the end of the summer
of 1931 with the destruction of $70,000 wotth daily. The
purchase price for the burned coffee was obtained from a
tax of 10 shillings on each bag of coffee exported. The
burning of this coffee was the cause of the bloodless re-
volution which overthrew the provisional government in
November 1931. The coffee planters and military authorities
v/ere the forces behind the nev/ government. The planters
had insisted before the change of government that the fed-
eral government burn 18,000,000 bags. The federal gov-
ernment had refused because part of these stocks had been
pledged as collateral for the $100,000,000 international
loan. Under the new government burning was resumed but
on a larger scale.
Attempts to eliminate the surplus since 1951 .
The destruction of coffee by burning has con-
tinued to be the most important device to reduce the sur-
plus. The 10 shilling tax on exports, as before, has
financed the program. The total reduction of stocks up
21
to November 30, 1934 was 33,560,000 bags. This does
not include the 479,000 bags destroyed prior to June 1931
by the Sao Paulo Coffee Institute. In selecting coffee
for incineration, the attempt has always been made to pick
20, Saturday Evening Post - Febmary 20, 1932 -"South aine-
rica Tomorrow" - Isaac F. Marcosson - p. 85
21. Tea and Coffee Trade Journal-Dec. 1934--p. 590.
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the inferior grades. This has resulted in a gradual im-
provement in the quality of Brazilian coffee sent to fo-
reign markets in the last five years. The stock of coffee
held as collateral for the ^100,000,000 loan secured in
1931 has been segregated and reduced only according to a
firmly established plan. Under this plan Brazil has le-
vied an additional tax of 5 shillings per bag of coffee
exported and used the proceeds to make regular amortiz-
ation payments on the loan. Then the coffee held as col-
lateral for this recently amortized part of the loan is
released and either enters into commerce or is burned.
Another solution of the problem has been an
extensive advertising campaign carried on jointly by the
Brazilian producers and the coffee trade. A third me-
thod of relieving the situation was a bonus scheme,
v/hereby all importers of coffee received a free ship-
ment of coffee to the amount of 10;^ of their purchases.
Resentment against this plan in the United States caused
it to be quietly given up.
Prom this review it appears that Brazil is
handling her difficulties well. If such drastic mea-
sures had not been undertaken, she would have had on
hand June 30, 1934, 52,000,000 bags of coffee. V/hen
it is considered that the total annual consumption of the
world is hardly more than 26,000,000 bags, it can be seen
22. Tea and Coffee Trade Journal - Sept. 1934 - P. 272
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what a disastrous collapse of prices would have occurred,
v^ith the resulting impoverishment of her population, had
these stocks been thrust upon the market. As the sit-
uation now exists, Brazil’s statistical position is good
23
and prices are reasonable.
Alternative plan for Brazil .
The ultimate solution of the Brazilian problem
of overproduction is actual retirement of a portion of
the acreage devoted to coffee cultivation and the subs-
titution thereon of other crops. The present condition
is one of permanent overexpansion because statistics
shov/ that during the last twenty years Brazil’s pro-
duction has always been greater than the consumption
of her coffee in the rest of the world. The federal
government 'of Brazil would do well to impose a flat per-
centage reduction rate on coffee acreage. The Brazilian
department of agriculture presumably already knows what
other crops can be most profitably grov/n and sold at
home and abroad. The next step v/ould be to pass legis-
lation compelling land ov;ners to plant specific crops
on the land previously devoted to coffee >r else not
replant it at all. This undertaking v/ould present pro-
blems of administration akin to all measures of bureau-
cratic control. The Ministry of Agriculture would un-
23. Ibid - p. 272
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dergo expansion, crop and foreign trade experts would
have to he hired, and a larger clerical force would have
to be taken on. Yet the administrative costs of the
undertaking ¥/ould not be greater than the monetary loss
already incurred in the destruction of 33,500,000 bags
of coffee. Assuming a value of at least 5^ per pound
for the coffee burned, this loss $221,000,000
(132 pounds to a bag) from June 1931 to November 1934 -
and the burning still continues.
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PART III
The Kubher Industry
History of rubber production ,
Hevea brasiliensis is the botanical name for
the plant from which is obtained Para rubber, the rub-
ber most in demand commercially. Before 1900 the prin-
cipal source of rubber was the v/ild Hevea plant in the
i^azon valley. The trees grew wild in the Brazilian
jungle and v/ere tapped by natives. The result v/as an
irregular and impure supply of rubber. Sir Henry V'ick-
ham - an Englishinan, realized the advantage of placing
rubber trees on plantations, thus assuring more uniform
quality and a larger supply. This was just what the
trade had been looking for. Accordingly, he succeeded
in smuggling the seeds of the Hevea tree out of Brazil,
planting the seedlings in nurseries in London and trans
planting them for development on plantations in Ceylon
and Singapore. -^'roin this beginning plantation culti-
vation spread to the entire Malay Peninsula, Burma, In-
1
dia, Siam, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. In 1900 these
Middle East countries produced only four tons of plant-
ation rubber - as compared with 26,750 tons of wild rub
ber from Brazil and 27,000 tons from other countries
in South America and >^frica. By 1930 the figures for
plantation rubber had jumped 800,000 tons as compared
L. Encyclopedia Brittani ca-Vol . XXlll Eleventh Edition
p. 798
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with 20,800 tons from Brazil and other wild rubber oro-
2
ducing countries.
The hot, damp climate necessary for rubber tree
cultivation is found only between latitudes SO^ north and
20° south of the Equator, and this region encircling the
earth is called the "Rubber Belt". The "Inner Rubber Belt",
however, has an even more favorable climate for rubber.
This region extends between latitudes 10^ north and lOo
south of the Equator. The belt includes the Amazon val-
ley; portions of Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela in South
America; the Belgian Congo and Liberia in Africa; Cey-
lon in the East Indies; and the Philippine Islands in
3
the Pacific Ocean. Hevea brasiliensis grows best in
lands of low altitude and rich soil capable of holding
moisture.
Sources of capital invested .
By far the greatest amount of capital invest-
ed in rubber plantations comes from the English and the
Dutch. In England a wild speculative boom occurred
when the early rubber companies were being financed
in 1908-1S10. The rubber producing companies were
paying phenomenal dividends in as much as rubber, at
that time, had jumped from $1.00 to $2.90 per pound.
2. Glover and Cornell - The Development of American
Industries - p. 230. - Prentice Kail, 1934, ii.Y.
3. Ibid - p. 229.
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American capital is represented by the Ford Motor Company
plantations in Brazil, Firestone in Liberia, United
States Rubber in British Malaya and Sumatra, and Good-
year Rubber Co. in Sumatra. Of these plantations, those
ovmed by the United States Rubber Co. and Goodyear are
the only ones that have produced rubber extensively.
These plantations represent new planting stimulated by
the high prices resulting from the operation of the
Stevenson Plan.
Characteristics of plantation rubber tree cultivation .
Rubber trees require a period of six to eight
years to reach maturity. Thus, a planter must expect
to wait at least ten years before he begins to receive
a decent return on his investment. This is a stong
deterrent to the flow of capital into rubber cultiva-
tion during periods of low prices.
Rubber trees produce most abundantly under
constant care. Thus a stable labor supply close at
hand is necessary in arder to insure ideal growing con-
ditions. Also, in the preparation of ground for plant-
ing a vast amount of work must be done. It is necessary
to hew av/ay the dense tropical forest and transplant
the seedlings to the cleared area. After the plant-
ation is laid out, jungle growth must be constantly
kept back and leguminous crops planted between the trees
in order to retain the moisture in the soil.
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Estate and native rubber compared .
The size of plantations Traries from estates
covering thousands of acres to gardens of only a
fraction of an acre. The latter are tended by native
ovmers and their families. The same methods of cul-
tivation are employed except that they are more
thickly planted and contain other crops such as rice,
pineapples, and cassava. Production of rubber on
small native holdings is not as responsive to price
changes as the production of the large estates. The
natives depend on agriculture for a livelihood and
cultivate any crops that are suited to the soil and
climate. They push this cultivation as intensively
as possible with little regard for price changes, the
labor being carried on by the entire family. Thus
they represent a section of low cost producers that
seriously competes with the estate owners who attain
low-cost production through large-scale operation.
Reviev/ of rubber production and prices .
From 1900 to 1908 the price of rubber
hovered around $1.00 per pound, then began to rise
under the impetus of the demands of tire manufacturers
in the United States until it reached a top of $2.90.
In the early part of 1920 the price commenced to drop
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and continued dovmward till 1921, The war period was
accompanied by the phenomena of declining lubber prices
when other prices were rising. This was due to over-
stimulation of the industry during the period of high
prices culminating in 1910, The price, however, had
been sufficiently high in 1910-1921 to bring nev/ land
into cultivation, so in the middle of 1921 the price
sank even lower to ll.bjzf per pound, when new production
came on the market. In 1922 the price rose to an
average of 17,5{zf, continued upward to 72.46;^ in 1925,
then started to slump, reaching a low of 3,49j2^ in
1932, The following table tells the story, especially
of the piling up of rubber stocks to a total of
517,000 at end of 1932:
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CRUDE RUBBER
(000 omitted)
Year World
Production
(tons)
World
Consumption
(tons
)
Central
Stocks at
end of year
(tons
)
Average
Price at
New York
( cents
)
1922 379 394 205 17,5
1923 412 439 163 29.45
1924 421 458 105 26.2
1925 516 551 76 72.46
1926 614 534 149 48.5
1927 605 589 193 37.72
1928 649 667 122 22.48
1929 863 785 228 20.55
1930 821 685 365 11.98
1931 797 669 496 6.17
1932 709 670 517 3.49
Soui'ce
:
Copeland, Melvin T,, Raw
Business Conditions, p.
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Because of new restriction agreements and increased
consumption of rubber for tires, rubber quotations began
to rise in 1924 after tne depression low and reached
15 9/16^ per pound towards the end of the year. By
September of 1935 they had fallen off a little to
5
11 5/8^.
6
The Stevenson Plan ,
It was asserted by the rubber trade in England
in 1920 that prices were so low as to threaten the abandon-
ment of vast areas devoted to rubber cultivation. Unless
I
some sort of cooperative action were taken, growers would
become bankrupt and their plantations would return to
jungle. A period of great scarcity of rubber would
follow in which consumers would be seriously penalized.
These claims may have been exaggerated, nevertheless
the Colonial Office of the British government responded
by appointing a committee, under the chairmanship of the
late Lord Stevenson, to inquire into conditions in the
rubber industry and report. Private efforts at voluntary
control of rubber production had already been tried and
had failed. The grov/ers were well represented on the
5. United Press Quotations, Review of Reviews, October,
1925, p. 54.
6. Wallace and Edminster, International Control of
Raw Materials, p. 175-194.
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coinmittee. It reported in May 1922 in favor of seeking
the cooperation of the Dutch government in a program
of output restriction. The Dutch producers declined
to join the plan, so the Colonial Office went ahead
alone. Directions concerning the proper legislation
to he passed were sent to the colonies, viz: The
Colony of the Straits Settlement, the four Federated
Malay States, the five Protected Malay States on the
Malay Peninsula, the protectorate of Sarawak on the
island of Borneo, and Ceylon. The colonies each
enacted legislation to restrict exports, and thereby
production of rubber. This group of enactments was
called the Stevenson Restriction Act and became ef-
fective Nov. 1, 1922,
The colonial authorities were given power
to allot to each estate a figure based on production
in the year ended October 31, 1920. This figure was
called "standard production", yet it always remained
less than the full productive capacity of the plantations
by amounts estimated at from 13 to 20^. The act provided
for export quotas to be altered every thj?ee months to
correspond with price changes. The exact provisions
were originally as follows:'^ "During the three months
7. Ibid., pp. 177-178.
M y;,; rfl til 5f'.‘ . •:• -V' , •*i-rr
' rtT '••/' •' "*'i 'V-J
'
'
’• •'';OCO ct
V fii6i^bO‘- /‘>r|rA; t .t;jrr C' lO
f>H'>r' ‘no ' o -^-f'
-• OP.
. u>Ui •jdi nii)\
:. -r 1. •.
.
'* o .' i ry^nrC . • ''•?
>r . '• jiiJC' T'-o >;! oi
"t' X^oIoO
^.r. U-. ' ' i rJzt Vf
•>.’$.
‘ f O 1o f>
A
vsXii^d
ri-'if-;*;, ', >. TOXO*'' O*'. . < 0»- . *'' tfldCl
V -'d • • ’
,
;.N ' 0,xm .7 -j ‘'.l ‘:ioI bc;toane
a iv -jiro- :• ^<5^^ lo qrf *:: lo .-.oXJoi/bo'iq
-'=•
-) . i'."u * ' .ol.t -. /.-x^' -.o. . V er'i boXica
,
-^cr ,, ,-p.r ovtXn^'i
‘t ’ -..-w ov-'. n
'.' 0 T ^ tl-ra.r'- f .. ’•noXo'O -Ow*
' i j 0:' iit .yo'jxjrf •.''vie', 0“.-5j”:'^ iooD ; ‘ .‘Ollfi o*
.»
.
• w
.if
' '
.
r
,
»•,
'lo • ' 0;jj fil
'i ^.•'•1 ^
'
'.v^;* * i: i-' * . ' t- 'X'. f'X.yX ;' C . m
''
- .i*^ l ’iix
i
0.: t .’.fiaCC’.-. > ^vl'rjj.ii,^: -, XX;;': or!:.
>hjtv- - n -: , ':. 0-; c-I •nn*j' " >0 Xx •
’
'* 7 s^ri”coL>i *;d
oA : A '> - \1 y/it j Mo DC • ’ .T s •' Xo i' p d*! 0a .'0 “X o'l
i. .. J.3
.' V'-*-ii< O ' .•0/;i,-0 . 'ir, fx^toor. vi-ioo
r.rfui^nrr
-47-
beginning Nov. 1, 1922, no plantation is allowed to
export at a rate which will exceed in a full year,
60^ of its standard production. If during that quar-
ter, the price of rubber in London averages less than
one shilling (23{zf) per pound, the percentage of stan-
dard production upon v/hich the rate of exportation
for the follov/ing should be based is reduced from 60
to 55^. Similarly, if in any subsequent quarter,
the price of rubber in London averages below one
shilling a pound, 5^ of standard production is sub-
tracted from the percentage v/hich has been permitted
to be exported in the previous three months. If the
price in London for any quarter averages over 1 s. 3 d.
( 29 ^) a pound, the amount v/hich might be expoi’ted
during the next three months will be made greater than
in the preceding quarter by 5% of standard production.
And if the London price of rubber during any quarter
exceeds 1 s. 6 d. (34jzf), the rate of the release of
rubber for export will be raised by 10^ of standard
production.
"
In 1925 prices rose to over $1.00 per pound,
then began to fall rapidly. During 1926 the drop was
so rapid that the Act was changed to regulate exports
more severely. The following changes were made to
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go into effect for the twelve months beginning Nov. 1, 1926:®
"if the average London price of rubber is less
than 21 d, ( 45^) but not less than 15 d. (29j2f) per pound
during any quarter, the percentage of standard product-
ion exportable at the minimum rate of duty for the
ensuing quarter v/ill be reduced 10)^, unless the re-
duction is from the figure of 100^ v;hen reduction v/ill
be to 80^.
"if the average price for any quarter is be-
tween 21 d. (43^) and 24 d. ( 49^), no change will be
made in the exportable allowance unless in each of
three consecutive quarters the average price is over
21 d, (43^2^), in which case the exportable percentage
for the fourth quarter will be increased by 10^.
"if the average price for any quarter stands
at 24 d. or over, the exportable percentage will be
increased by 10 for the ensuing quarter, except when
the figure stands at 80^, when an advance will be
made to 100^ of standard production.
"if the average price is below 15 d. (29/)
in any quarter, the exportable percentage in the ensuing
quarter will be reduced to 60^.
"if the average price in any quarter is over
8. Ibid., p. 179.
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36 d. (74{zf), the exportable percentage in the ensuing
quarter will be advanced to 100%,
"No provision is made for production at a
rate above 100^ or belov; 60^ of standard production,'*
These new regulations, however, had little
effect in preventing the downward trend in prices.
The British government lost faith in the plan and both
the British public and large American consumers of
rubber becaxae more and more critical of it. So on
November 1, 1928 it was given up entirely.
Factors influencing operat i on of the Plan.
The Stevenson Act did not stop the upward
trend in v;orld output of rubber for several reasons.
Most important of all, the production of the Dutch
colonies, especially the Dutch l^ast Indies, was not
included in the restriction plan,^ Also, the cul-
tivation of wild rubber all over the world and of estate
rubber in India and French Indo -China were beyond the
jurisdiction of the plan. Furthermore, restriction did
not affect the smallest estates. This production though
slight, helped increase total output. Finally, certain
British Malaya rubber producers evaded the export tax
by smuggling rubber into the Dutch East Indies. From
9. Copeland, Melvin T., Rav/ Material Prices and Business
Conditions, p. 25.
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there it was shipped out with Dutch rubber.
chart on p. 50 gives a picture of the temporary de-
crease in British output and the permanent increase
in world output.
Prices, as has been mentioned, reacted
strongly. There was a steep climb to #1.05 per pound
in 1925 and a violent fall in 1926. The rise in
prices was more than a coincidence. So definite v/as
the rise, it is fairly certain that the Stevenson
Act must have had something to it. Other factors
also can be named. First, users of rubber were buying
early because of anxiety about a possible scarcity.
Secondly, there v/as an increased demand from the ever-
expanding automobile industry; and third, a stimulated
consumption of rubber from the tire industry because
of the invention of the balloon tire, this new tire
requiring more rubber than the old cord tire.^^
The reaction to the price rise came partly
from the state of mind of consumer and partly from
natural forces. V.Tien it became clear to industrialists
that the Stevenson Plan was going to fail, they held off
buying in anticipation of a crop in prices. This re-
duction in purchases contributed materially to the
actual fall in prices which was started by the jump in
10. Wallace and Edminster, p. 182.
11. Copeland, Melvin T., Raw Mat. Prices and Business
Conditions, p. 25.
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production of from 528,000 tons in 1925 to 624,000
tons in 1926^and the resort to reclaimed rubber by
the industry’s largest consuming country. 13
Justification for the Stevenson Plan .
It is very probable that the agitation for
the Stevenson Plan was prompted originally not so
much on account of the alleged depressed condition of
the rubber industry but rather because of the desire
of the producers for quasi-monipolistic profits.
Costs of production had been reduced as
prices fell, most all companies were operating at a
profit in 1922, and no failures occurred in Malaya even
in 1921-22'. Neither was the slump in prices as un-
expected as it was claimed to have been. Data con-
cerning new acreage planted had been available for
several years to the management of rubber companies.
It appeared certain that unless demand picked up
substantially, production v;as increasing to such an
extent that low prices would be inevitable. Further-
more, the corner had already been turned as far as
prices were concerned, because two months before
12. Wallace and Edminster, p. 193.
13. Copeland, Melvin T., In 1925 the U.S. consumption
of reclaimed rubber was 137,105 tons, 35.6^ of
the consumption of crude rubber.
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the Act was passed they had begun an upswing
The precarious position that was alleged to
exist can probably be traced to faulty financial
management. Studies of 52 representative companies
reveal that they earned an average of 25^ on issued
capital for fourteen years ending vi^ith 1922 and paid
out in dividends an average of 22^ in each of these
years. This leaves only 4^ yearly to take care of
the expenses of expansion. Since most companies were
expanding steadily, it is hard to see hov; these com-
panies could have built up any surplus for emergencies.
Hence, entirely through fault of their ov/n, they were
in no position to weather a period of low prices.
Naturally, they were very anxious for the government
to pass a law which would allov; them to shift the
burden of their mistakes onto consiuners. The Act,
as we have seen, was not solely responsible for the
price rise, but they were perfectly willing that it
should be.
Effect of Stevenson Act on world production .
The Stevenson Act stimulated world production
to such an extent that the industry became permanently
overexpanded. Prices of 10 to 12/ per pound in London
14. Wallace and Edrninster, p. 206.
15. Figart, D.M., U.S. Dept, of Commerce, "The
Plantation Rubber Industry in the Middle East,"
Trade Promotion Series No. 2, 1925, p. 9.
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or New York are said to be necessary to cover costs.
Yet, since 1930, the price of rubber in New York has
been less than 10^ per pound, - and for several years
was less than 5^ per pound. The companies ovming 5-arge
estates kept up production because it was more econo-
mical in the long run than complete shut-dov/n. They
also were averse to discharging their large forces of
trained men who had been imported at great expense from
16
India and China.
Effects of Stevenson Plan on consumers .
The burden of that part of the rise in prices
v/hich can be ascribed to the Act was heavy on consumers
especially those in the United States. This country
consumes approximately 50;^ of the world’ s rubber pro-
duction. Rubber growers blamed the 10 ^ rise in price
in 1923-24 over 1921-22 on the Stevenson plan. Thus
purchasers in the United States paid in 1924 approxi-
mately tl40,000,000 more for the 1,400,000,000 pounds
of rubber which they used than they w'ould have paid
without the Act. In 1925-26 years higher prices are
estimated to have caused the burden to rise to
$400,000,000.
Intergovernment Rubber Agreement .
Even after the failure of the Stevenson Plan
the .British v/ere persistent in their efforts to se-
16. Copeland, Melvin R. - pp. 26,27.
17. V allace and Edminster - p. 213.
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cure some measure of control over rubber production.
They kept trying to persuade the Dutch to join them in
a program of this sort, but the Dutch continually re-
fused, saying they were unable to control native pro-
duction. In 1932, after going off the gold standard,
the British gave up agitation for a new restriction
plan entirely and adopted the attitude that if any-
thing was to be done, the Dutch would have to be the
first to suggest it. Finally, in the spring of 1933 the
Prime Minister of the Netherlands expressed the wish of
the Dutch producers that some sort of an agreement be
negotiated. Behind the willingness of the Dutch to
cooperate now, v/as probably recognition of their im-
mediate need for revenue, the current unprofitable-
ness of rubber plantations, and their experiences in
the control of sugan and tin. Therefore a committee
of the Du.tch Internat ional Association for Rubber Cul-
tivation met on June 21, 1933 v/ith representatives of
British, French, and other producers in Middle Asian
territory. It v;as not until the spring of 1934 that
the producers came to an agreement which was signed by
representatives of the governments of the Jnited Kingdom,
the Netherlands, France, India, with qualifications, and
Siam. The purpose of the Intergovernment Agreement, as
it was called, was stated to be: "regulate the produc-
tion and export of rubber in and from producing countries
b.
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with the object of reducing world stocks to a normal
figure, and adjusting in an orderly manner supply to
demand, and maintaining a fair and equitable price le-
13
vel which will be remunerative to efficient producers."
19
Provisions of the Intergovernrnent i-i.greement .
Under this agreement there was first set up
an International Rubber Regulation Committee. This
body was empowered to establish restriction percent-
ages and do anything necessary to carry out the stated
purpose of the Intergovernment /igreement. The follov/-
ing representation on the Committee was given to each
country: four members and two substitute members from
Malaya, three members and two substitute members from
Netherlands India, one member and one substitute from
Ceylon, from India and Burma together, one member and
one substitute, and from North Borneo, Sarawak, and
Siam one member and one substitute member each -- twelve
members and nine substitute members in all. The rep-
resentatives from each country must vote as a unit. One
vote is granted for every complete 1,000 tons of the
basic quota for that country.
Basic quotas v/ere established for each camtry and
the restriction percentages applied against them, a
18. Asia - June, 1935 - pp. 327-331 - "International Rub-
ber Agreement", - Everett G. Holt and '‘'arren S. Lock-
wood.
19. Asia - July, 1935 -"The Rubber Control Scheme at Work",-
Kolt and Lockv/ood - pp. 422-425.
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basic quota is tbe average yearl;/" production of a coun-
try during the depression years preceding the Agree-
ment. The plan is to last 4^ years, hence quotas v/ere
set for the first and last years of the plan. The quo-
tas in long tons for 1934 and 1938 are as follov/s: Ma-
laya, 504,000 and 602,000; Netherlands India, 352,000
and 435,000; Ceylon, 77,500 and 82,500; India, 6,350
and 9,250; Burma, ^50 and 9,250; North Borneo, 12,000
and 16,500; Sarawak, 24,000 and 32,000; Siam 40,000
both years.
Restriction percentages are the key devices
v/hich carry out the v/ill of the Regulation Committee.
They are uniformly applied to all producers unless other
wise stated. For the first ten months of the plan they
were: June -July, 1934, 100^; August -September
,
90;^;
October-November
,
QQ%) December, 70^; January, Februa-
ry, March, 1935, 75^. Indo-China is given special
treatment in that exports are not subject to restric-
tion percentages unless they exceed 30,000. The reason
for this is that as yet rubber cultivation in Indo -China
is undeveloped and even with the encouragement of a
subsidy from France, exports in 1933 were below 20,000
tons
.
This covers the most important provisions of
the agreement itself. 'iTie next phase of the problem to
consider is that of apportioning the basic production
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quotas to the producers in each region. The method
of carrying this out is not set by the International
Agreement but is determined according to the will of
the individual governments participating. In Malaya
and Netherlands India the allotraentof shares of pro-
duction involves an immense amount of v/ork. It is
helped, somewhat, by records concerning each producer
kept in the offices of the government. Since native
production plays such an important part in the total
Netherlands India output, the basic quota of that coun-
try was split up between estate and native producers
according to a constant percentage. Native production
is limited to 71.5^ of estate production throughout
the 4^ years of the plan. The natives undoubtedly
could turn out more than this, but unless they are
checked in this manner, their output might upset the
v;hole scheme. The v/eapon used by the Dutch to enforce
this percentage is an export tax in Sumatra and Borneo
and a license in Java.
20
Operation of the Inter/.;overninent Agreement .
Near the end of the first quarter of 1935,
prices v/ere still falling after a temporary high of
15.47{2^ per pound in August, 1934. So in March, the
Intergovernment Committee set the rate for April, May,
and June at 70^, and the rate at 65;^ for the second
half of the year. In New York the news of the lower
20. Asia - July, 1935 - p. 426-427.
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percentage caused the price of rubber futures to ad-
vance per pound. However, the price in April,
after ten months operation of the plan, was lower
than in April 1934. The influences behind this low
price were probably the continued large supplies of
rubber coming into consuming markets, the possibili-
ty of rubber strikes in factories in Akron, and the
fluctuations of international exchange rates for the
pound, the dollar, and the guilder.
Criticism of the plan .
Though its operation to date has not been
encouraging, the plan should be considered from a
long-time point of view before it can be condemned
or praised. That it will remain in force for a leng-
thy period seems certain because the agreement pro-
vides for a conference under British leadership in
1938 to consider extension of the plan.
As things stand now, the plan offers very
little uncertainty as to stable prices. Forces
contributing to this uncertainty are the ignorance
of what prices producers are expecting the agitation
for new production quotas in the small countries,
and the difficulty of limiting native production to
the figure set. Furthermore, international exchange
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rates are still in an unstable condition, an increased
consumption of reclaimed rubber is taking place, and
experiments for obtaining rubber from other plants,
especially the wild guayule of Mexico, are being
21
carried on more extensively. It has already been
found possible to obtain 1500 pounds of rubber an
acre once every three years from the guayule plant.
(This equals the usual maximum possible production
from an acre planted with Hevea brasiliensis)
. The
expense of the complicated machinery necessary in
22
its cultivation, hov/ever, is still very high.
The good features of the plan deserve men-
tion. It covers a vastly larger area of world pro-
duction acreage (over 90^i?) than its predecessor, the
Stevenson Plan. It is much more flexible, since
restriction percentages can be changed at a monents
notice by the International Rubber Regulation Com-
mittee.
The problem of overproduction is essentially
a batisle between the large estate owners on one hand
who lean towards controlled production and •che small
21. Asia, July, 1925, pp. 422-427.
22. Saturday Evening Post, May 2, 1931, p. 110.
"Taming the Wild Guayule", Samuel G. Blythe.
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holders and native producers on the other, who strive
for increased production. According to Messrs. Holt
and Lockwood, the rubber industry itself is skeptical
concerning the ultimate benefits of restriction and
looks for the way out in another direction.
"Vdiatever opposing rubber interests may think of re-
striction they are agreed that the future prosperity
of the industry depends on discovering or creating
new uses for rubber. If this is a correct ex-
pression of the attitude of rubber producers, the most
that can be expected from the new plan is stabilization
of the price level rather than creation of profits.
The production of rubber is carried on in
so many countries that it is impossible to recommend
acreage reduction as a plan for the rubber industry,
such as I have suggested for the coffee industry.
Overproduction of coffee is a Brazilian problem rather
than a v/orld problem. Furthermore, the difficulties
of enforcing such a program among a large number of
highly individualistic native producers are so great
as to seriously endanger its chances of success from
the very beginning.
23. Copeland, Melvin T., Raw Material Prices and
Business Conditions, p. 27.
24. Asia, July, 1935, p. 427.
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PAKT IV
THE TIN PRODUCTION INDUSTRY
Distribution of tin resources .
Tin is found in only limited areas of the
globe. The principal producing countries are Malaya,
Dutch East Indies, lov/er Burma, Siam. China, Nigeria,
and Bolivia. These countries supply over 95^ of the
world’s output. Regions of minor importance are the
Belgian Congo, Cornwall, Spain, Portugal, and Australia.
Recently, a good deal of work has been done by British,
Belgian and Dutch companies in exploring the region
west and southwest of Lake Victoria by British, Belgian,
and Dutch companies. Tin ore has been found in Nyasaland,
Portuguese East Africa, Rhodesia, Natal, Swaziland, and
the Cape Colony.^ These regions, hov/ever, are of no
commercial importance. The table on page 63 covers
world production from 1927-31.
1, Index, August, 1932, "The V/orld's Staples. XV, Tin,
P. Hovig Svenska Handelsbanken, p, 236.
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2
Mine Production of Tin
(in thousands of long tons)
1927 1928 1929 1930 1931
Europe 4.0 3.6 4.1 3.1 1.7
Malay States 54.3 64.5 69.4 64.0 52.6
Dutch East Indies 33.4 34.9 35.7 34.3 28.0
Siam 7.5 7.6 10.5 11.5 12.4
Burma 2.4 1.8 2.7 3.0 2.0
China 6.2 6.8 6.8 6.5 6 .
6
Elsewhere in Asia .6 1.8 .9 1.3 1.8
Nigeria 8.0 9.1 10.7 8.8 7.3
Elsewhere in Africa 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.0
Bolivia 35.8 41.4 46.3 37.0 28.8
Australia 3.1 2.9 2.2 1.5 1.0
WORLD TOTAL 158.0 177.1 191.8 172.7 144.2
2. Index, August, 1932, p. 236.
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Sources of capital invested .^
Before 1900 most all tin mines on the Malay
Peninsula and in the Dutch East Indies were owned or
rented by Chinese. The British began to invest their
capital only hesitatingly. But now it is estimated
that British investments are sunk in at least 50^
of the World’s productive tin capacity under normal
conditions. The table on page 63 shov/s that in 1929,
90,000 tons of tin out of a world total of 190,000
tons came from countries in the British Empire. Also
most of Siam’s output in controlled by British capital.
Other countries of major importance are the Dutch East
Indies with 20^ of world output, and Bolivia with 24^.
The tin ore of Nigeria and a large part of
that from Bolivia is handled by smelters in Great
Britain. These smelters are owned by the V/illiams,
Harvey and Co., and the Penpoll Tin Smelting Co.,
both of Booth near Liverpool, and the Cornish Tin
Smelting Co. of Cornv/all. The capital in these com-
panies is furnished for the most part by Englishmen.
The mines at Banka are avned and operated by
the Dutch government. The government employs trained
3# Ibid., pp. 238,239.
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englneers to supervise the work. The island of
Billiton nearby is owned by a Dutch company called
Billiton Maatschappi j , This company and the Dutch
government dominate tin production in the Dutch
East Indies. British capital entered Malayan tin
mining in 1877 when the Straits Trading Co. v/as
established near Singapore. By 1912 the output of
Europe an-owned mines had reached 26/o of the total
Malayan production. It increased to 32^ in 1918
and to 65;^ in 1931. In Siam early capital came
from two British companies and one Dutch company.
In Nigeria, also, most of the mines are British owned.
Tin Smelting .
Small scale tin smelting was the rule before
the beginning of the twentieth century. Tin ore, being
a pure oxide may be reduced to practically the pure
metal by merely smelting one ore in most any kind of a
furnace. Today, however, the smelting is carried on
generally on a much larger scale. The plants of the
Straits Trading Co. at Singapore and Penang and of the
Eastern Smelting Co. at Penang take care of the smelting
4. Ibid., p. 238.
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requirements of Ores from China, Australia, South
Africa, Nigeria, and the mines of Burma, Siam, and
the Federate Malay States. Bolivia ore also smelted
in the Strait s.^ According to modern technique the
plants use coal as both fuel and reducing agent in
their furnaces. The output is tin of great purity
and it is knovm as "Straits Tin."
Banka tin comes from Banka in the Dutch
East Indies. In the smelting process an improved
version of the Chinese shaft furnace is employed, in
which the ore is reduced by means of charcoal. Banka
tin is the purest in the world.
Course of prices and production .
Before 1916 the price of tin did not show
fluctuations anywhere nearly as violent as during and
after the war.^ In 1916 the price passed its previous
high and mounted to a peak of almost L400 per long ton,
which, after a sudden drop in 1918, it equalled again
in early 1919. To be sure the price always shows
marked, short-time changes but these are to be expected
5. Spurr and Worraser, Marketing of Metals and Minerals
6. Ibid., p. 186, Table of yearly average tin prices
since 1895.
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because of the inelasticity of demand for tin. In-
creases or decreases in the price of tin have little
effect on purchasing because the cost of tin is such
a small fraction of the cost of the finished product
made from it. Hence, v/hen supply exceeds demand, a
sudden drop in price occurs, because buyers seldom
more than enough for their immediate requirements
due to the expense of tying up capital in so valuable
a commodity. Also, when there is a tin shortage, the
price shoots up, since consumers must have the tin at
any price. In 1921 and 1922 the price dropped to
tl50 per ton, --almost the pre-war low, (In this
study prices are quoted in pounds sterling per long
ton rather than in dollars because world prices are
set in London.) Prices then began to rise in 1922,
as world consumption increased more rapidly than
world production. They kept rising to a peak of over
L300 per ton in early 1927. In 4^ years this represents
a rise of 100^, After that, however, the price began
to slide and continued to do so for 5^ years until it
nearly touched LlOO in April, 1932,^
7, Index, August, 1932, p, 245.
8. Copeland, Melvin T., Raw Material Prices and Business
Conditions, p. 12,
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The jump in during 1922-26 caused production
to increase and continue its increase after the price
had started to fall early in 1927. Accordingly, stocks
began to pile up in the United States, in Europe, and
in transit to the extent of 13,300 tons in 1926, For
almost tv/o years the visible supply v/avered between
13,300 and 16,200 tons. In the middle of 1928, they
topped 18,000 tons, mounted to 26,600 tons in March
1929. This date marks the beginning of the period of
serious difficulties for the tin industry. By the
end of 1929 stocks had reacted to the extent of
28,100 tons, then climbed to 51,700 tons in July 1931.^
Private attempts to limit output .
This was the state of affairs when the
International Tin Committee was organized in 1931.
But let us first consider private attempts- at limiting
output of tin. In July, 1929 a meeting v/as held in
London of officers of 167 tin mining companies re-
presenting about 50^ of the world’s production. Out
of this conference came the Tin Producers' Association,
Inc., v/ith the avowed purpose of settling all problems
facing the members of the association, A program of
9. Ibid., p. 12
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voluntary restriction by the members was outlined.
This was loyally carried out by certain companies,
but the failure to cooperate by other members of the
association, as v;ell as the fact that the total pro-
ductive capacity of the association was only half of
world capacity caused the plan to be given up.
The Tin Restriction Scheme .
The plan of private producers was soon
replaced by one officially knov/n as the "Quota Scheme
but commonly referred to as the International Tin Re-
striction Plan. According to this agreement the govern-
ment of Dutch East Indies, Nigeria, the Federated Malay
States, and Bolivia placed their representatives on a
committee called the International Tin Committee. The
reason these four governments were anxious to put
through a restriction program was that public revenues
in the tin-producing countries are largely dependent on
the profitableness and steadiness of tin sales. ^^Con-
sequently it would be easier to balance their budgets
if tin prices were stable rather than fluctuating and
on a reasonable high level. The purpose of the scheme
was stated to be "to secure a fair and reasonable
10. Index, August, 1932, p, 249.
11. Copeland, Melvin T., p. 12,
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equilibrium between production and consumption with the
view of preventing repeated and severe oscillations of
the prices”^^ This may be safely assumed to mean
profitable prices to all concerned.
Under the original agreement the allotted
v/orld production of 145,000 tons was shared as follov/s:
Malaya, 53,925 tons; Bolivia, 34,260 tons; Dutch East
Indies, 29,910 tons; and Nigeria, 7,750. The quota may
be changed by unanimous vote of the four countries, but
the ratio of each country’s output to the total must
remain the same. The plan went into effect March 1, 1931.
In September Siam came in. This brought the percentage
of world output controlled by the members up to 95,^^
Each government is responsible for regulating
production and export in its country v^ithin the allotted
quota. The participating governinents are allowed to
choose their own method of distributing the allotted
quota among the companies in their country. The fol-
lowing procedure is used in the Malay States: "Certificates
allocating permissible production are issued only for the
quota periods and are granted only to owners of land al-
ready mined or prepared for mining . . . Penalties for
non-observance of regulations range from the cancellation
12. Index, August, 1932, p. 249
13. Ibid., p. 249.
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of licenses and confiscations to fines of $2,000.
Deliberate evasions are subject to fines of twenty
times the value involved or a flat penalty of $5,000.*'^^
Further provisions of the plan pertain to the
organization of an International Tin Pool, in which is
placed tin bought from producers and in the open market.
This pool represents an attempt to unload excess stocks
onto the market with the least amount of friction. The
pool began its operations in August 1931 v/hen it v/as
discovered that the Federated Malay States had mined
4800 tons of tin more- than they were allov/ed. The
holdings of the pool, which were 21,000 tons on
January 1, 1932, are placed on the market in amounts
which vary with market prices. b% of the stocks held
are released if the price averages L165 for one month.
The timing of these sales and the prices at which they
are made cannot be altered except by consent of every
government party to the agreement
•
Another pool was set up in 1934 known as
the Buffer Stock Pool, It is controlled by the Inter-
national Tin Committee and its function is to keep a
supply of tin in reserve to be released for sale if
any temporary shortage occurs. The International Tin
14. Harvard Business Review, October, 1932, C.L, James,
"international Control of Tin Ore", p. 71,
15, Index, August, 1932.
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Committee watches world consumption and production
continually and sends out advice periodically concern
16
ing changes in quotas.
Operation of the Tin Quota Scheme .
For the first half of 1922 world stocks
remained fairly steady at between 60,000 and 62,000
tons after rising to 63,124 tons in August 1931. Two
curtailments of quotas, one of 20,000 tons in May
1931 and another of 15,000 tons in Hov ember succeed-
ed in lowering world production to 110,000 tons. This
levelling off of world stocks demonstrates the ad-
ministrative efficiency of the plan and its speed in
reacting to changes in demand. The price of tin, how
ever, has continued to fall.
In 1932 tne International Tin Committee
voted a further restriction of production desig-ned
to bring world stocks down to a reasonable amount.
In June this resolution was made even more drastic
by the decision to discontinue exports completely
during July and August and release the amount held
17
back in equal amounts during the next ten months.
After these new restrictions were imposed,
16. Commerce and Finance - March 6, 1935. “The Inter-
national Tin Pool“ - p. 201.
17. Index - Aug. 1932 - pp. 250-252.
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the price began a steady rise in the summer of 1932.
Contributing to this rise was a pick-up in industrial
activity all over the world. Under the impulse of
this force and restriction the price reached 't228
by the end of 1933. (It is estimated that most pro-
ducers could make a profit if tin were selling at
18
?.100 a ton. ) During 1934 the price stayed between
fc227 and L239 a ton. During the early part of 1935,
however, the price fell to -L214 and at the present
writing it is 4.213 (about 48^ per pound in New York).
Thus, the plan is apparently working successfully
19
and making money for producers.
Criticism of the Tin ^uota Scheme .
The main criticism of the plan is that it treats
both high and low-cost producers alike. The lov/-cost
producers will soon see that they can increase sales
and hence make more money by selling at lov/er prices.
It will be difficult to satisfy the demands of this
20
group for increases in quotas.
Another criticism of the plan is that it
arouses consumer hostility because of its mainten-
ance of an excessively high price. Consumers in-
clude industrialists such industrialists such as
18. Business V.'eek--^lay 19, 1934-"Breakers ivhead for
Tin".
19. Coiunerce and Finance --.uar
.6, 1935. p. 201.
20. Ibid--p. 201
. I
.-I
1
It. iii*'« 'J .
I. *
**
’ M V- ' . ' W'® .
• lA. w ' *
'
^
*
-'Y'
^
V
'5^* '
^ u
*
i5*sW' ta^l^ ‘B-lrf^’ ,Xi
^ t~ '• 1 ' *b T ^ 1
ex£f. 'is^br'^a *£iev>> XX«
^ .
"-y
' ,45
' ‘-
»ii? 0o^<yV 6ir{4 :’
_
'*-^ •
: .,
,
. •_
.
''
''^:'
: .y- .. ’i.v
• v<««r •« *>#%^ «Alb f •* tl *4 ^ ^ 1 & .S*' Jl f A .' ' * # *
-O'lq UeOtr ^i' ^ty acU:^
'
'a ..
•&
- y; _y> '^’’V^
iti. jyiitXS,^^ ri'^vr 1 f B fcx«»cm' B*joai/5
ea^g-oH-l ( .noJ ^ (Xrlr "
^
«
--
^ ’*.'-»
'I' •
"tb j Bcii *jw»4l 6i|b'
jtv?^ ' - ' , -tiis3D‘io .or>;t *fu 2hik 9'i'^ bt 4^^ ^tevow^rff
- jr£^-/iWi<xw
' '
* Ks , '.*V -. '• •. :^* •J* -' ' '
i
...
- BX ’ '*-' * ' ' ' ,
'
•
‘',4
^'-,f«^
,
V. ,#
• .
,' *1 r. |;|l|i
,
Vi
,
*
.
i** '
. 4;
.‘-
^
>*a1. e
^
,
.v',
•-
•
.
'^biy {i!^y eifa *1& |feXb'l':»X*iO * ;il
'
, ^
. J
'
: .
>0 fj
i>in*l St haaXj^ to alasa. ©rfi’ ^
K
;>ai. -wdl «k^ ,6-itXIjt »^soi»j5crj)[i (>fl« fl^iit il^od
:^2.^ j|E it ‘^
' K
' '
'
cel ft© ftflo f©r'cr T XX fw B’jeaabo'iq
Vii
. •joot'xt? *<n^>X te snXlX©^ t:<£ v'fkfldi': en'^w ©yecr* o^aeif bi'ta.-.T
^ et'iit 'to t; ^»;nj/u<>{j ^ji t 4i«r>illlb etf rxi^
' V " -^v , - ’ ,
.aetpijp ^ *iol 500^13
\?i'’
>i
r ’ > A '4-
,'i. -mv>:a^
zl
fi
f *_. jj
11 ftx ^e^rflOnA
‘
‘
'
*
i
.1^
'
,
’-
^JP , • ''3
al'i: t^^yeew^ss^f/ijliXJi^e'^ *;W30o:k^o c©*3v<WA;V^’ V ^ i'J
\ . ,'ij
.'
-r^t e.'<dMfe#^dt>" nn *to \aon» \
’
.-
-
‘
• H
c« ^;tfa Q'^aXXvj.i^ti/fcnX.
.
, .,.f: I „ i^.->-T=, __- _ _- . . . -,
1of ru* « 9 1 V* -— ^
^
^^ ^ ^ !
t<J
.iOt* .n -iijSifi. O'^qeouiOl *9£
'
,^:'
,
?-, ^iySs vq-6irfl. •;
.-.j i
r i lA I
’
X
-74-
autOiiiobile producers and tin-plate manufacturers.
Their reaction may follow several courses. They may
adopt substitutes such as lacquers and aluminum to
replace the tin lining in cans, paper cartons proces-
sed against v/ater, rustless iron and steel containers,
or containers of glass and cellophane. Another
course is the use of tin recovered from old tin cans
and scrap. This industry is already flourishing in
Japan and the United States. The output in 1933 was
higher than in any year since 1929 and v/as equally high
in 1934. A third alternative, and admittedly a last
resort, is a complete cessation of buying, in short,
a boycott.
On the side of supply, an influence vdiich
v/ill lessen the effectiveness of the plan is in-
creased production by the non-participating countries.
Since the members of the plan control 95^ of world
output, and since tin ore occurrs in only limited
areas of the globe, this possibility is not of im-
mediate concern, although it will be of more impor-
tance if tin is discovered in Central and South Afri-
ca.
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PART V
Suramary and Conclusion
Suimnar^"
:
although the mechanism for accomplishing
the purposes of the rubber, coffee, and tin restric-
tion plans have varied in minor details, the main-
spring of all three plans is the same the restraint
of a normal supply of a commodit^T- from coming to mar-
ket. Although no direct mention is made of price-
fixing in the tin and coffee plans, there v/as a def-
1
inite price objective in the Stevenson Plan. V/hether
stated or not, the purpose of these restrictive mea-
sures v/as to raise prices so that even the high cost
producers could sell at a slight margin of profit.
That prices did rise v/hen coffee valorization began,
at the inception of the Stevenson plan, and after
the formation of the International Tin Committee is
shov/n by record of the facts. In all these schemes,
it must be remembered that it was not they alone that
were responsible for the price rise. The weather and
a timely increase in industrial activity can be cred-
ited vith a .s equal or greater share in the response
1. Pivotal prices v/ere 1 s.(23{^) and 1 s. 3d(29f^). These
prices v/ere adopted on the grounds that they allov;ed
rubber grov/ers a "fair" return on their investment.
>I*.
' V'«t.
. / tr.
-
,T^
-w . »V ’, V *v^ '
•.vn/#:»af!U
“vi* r V V
>
j?.-' "
.
‘
•' 17*5 ^
' ' ^ *
”jJ
•
-.'i*K -|>-t ^ ^ :c , ,»4 ' tXt?<4'Jt^
.
'^",
^.r-
a
;9is iL * "
f'/,^-*-
. .JK ‘ . ** j^-
^
i- ^•' ‘-* <
-es-.
*•
.1 ^ *^ ’. *#. 7^'
,r
.J;
-«-^^-v..
'"'
' *
’i: -
.
r '
i > 1-^ . '.»v3[' *- - - ' ‘ _>V1 -• V. . . -'-^ -
,
> 3V Ifi^^ii^Ji ’^!lt to fi^da'9'^'- -
i^'»6 4^sla >04*t.i ee'ijwra
'5.!
-,s; . Kfl '-.• •'SsMt.-^'.a
' ' ^
.
<
^1'
'r* ^i,lr ® ! . '^ . fc .
Jr * • ^ \
~*~ ^ s» * '
—
,*^ H - ‘ • ^'4
.i i •
'
' 2
- •^^ESHk^ •*
• •"'^
.j ® • *i
n. c*-^ •- r H
If. - -us-'-acu.
.
"
- ^.1: y '
'
_
.t y-i.^ :/*'
-76-
of prices.
An examination of the three plans nov/ in
operation reveals that their prospects of permanent
success are small. Altnough working successfully now,
the tin plan faces a reaction hy industrialists in
the direction of reclaimed tin and suostitutes. Both
tin and rubber are threatened with serious problems
in the internal operation of their control plans
raised by low-cost producers. Coffee, which is val-
orization rather than actual restriction, shows pro-
mise of continuing the record of chronic successes
that has been its history, but this will be achieved
only by exploiting its quasi-monopolist ic position and
thrusting a heavy burden on consumers. This position
is yearly being rendered less secure by producers in
other counxries and it is only a question of time be-
fore coffee overproduction will oecome a world pro-
blem rather than a Brazilian one.
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Conclusion ;
It is now time to bring together the ar-
gxiraents against restriction wnich have slowly been
accumulating by statement and implication in this stu-
dy. They may be divided into two groups:
(1) those demonstraxing tne inefficacy of restric-
tion plans as devices to rid society of useless pro-
ductive capacity, and
(2) those that illustrate the oDstacles impeding the
successful operation of control measures, from a
business point of view.
I think it is fair to say that these three
restriction schemes have thus far completely failed
to remove from their respective industries the unneces-
sary capital employed therein. To support this con-
clusion it is only necessary to cite the pages of
statistics telling the story of the continued piling
up of world stocks of rubber, coffee, and tin in
spite of the Stevenson Plan, the numerous coffee va-
lorization measures, and the International Tin Quota
Scheme. It is hard to see how the tin plan as well as
the others can do anything different but keep the ex-
isting superfluous producers in operation. That
there is surplus capacity in the tin mining industry,
as certainly as in the otner two industries, is shown
by tne fact that for six years preceding tne adoption
of the restriction plan, this surplus capacity was
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2
being reflected in an accumulation of v/orld stocks.
In line v;ith my second conclusion, it is
equally true that, as purely profit-making instru-
ments invented by business men to insure permanent
profits, control schemes are faulty in the following
respects
:
(1) Consumers will inevitably resort to substitutes
or reclaimed materials to replace commodities v/hose
prices are fixed too high.
(2) The difficulties of combining all producers
under one agreement are great. The unrestricted
producers may defeat the plan to hold up prices.
(3) There is a certain amount of inflexibility in
any agreement to control production. Due to the time
required for statistics to be collected and for ccm-
m.ittees to act, production quotas are not always
changed with the speed necessary to take advantage
of increases or decreases in demand.
(4) New producers are attracted into the industry
when prices rise above a certain point.
(5) There is a strong temptation among participants
in the agreement, to violate the regulations directly
and exceed the production quota.
2. Index--Aug. 1932--table on p. 247
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Sucli is the history of coffee, rubber, and
tin. I add it to the constantly increasing volume of
literature written in protest against these measures
restraining world trade in commodities. I hope I may
not seem unduly pessimistic when I say thai the chief
lesson history teaches us is that men seldom profit
by the examples of history.
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